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The Continuing Struggle Over
Rulemaking Authority Between
the Kentucky Supreme Court
and General Assembly
BY AMY JO HARWOOD"
INTRODUCTION
efore the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 19521 and
the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1962,2 Kentucky relied on
its legislature to enact and modify practice codes governing all
areas of law, including rules of procedure Realizing the difficulty of
maintaining these rules through the legislative process, the Kentucky
General Assembly created the civil rules and left their future amendment
to Kentucky's highest appellate court.4 By changing the format for
rulemaking inthe Commonwealth, the legislative branch sought concurrent
authority with the judicial branch.5 Until the Judicial Article6 was adopted
J.D. expected 1998, Umversity of Kentucky. The author would like to express
her appreciation to Professor Robert G. Lawson, Umversity of Kentucky College
of Law, for his assistance in the writing of this Note.
'Act effective July 1, 1953, ch. 84, 1952 KY. ACTS 214-42; see John S. Gillig,
Kentucky Post-Conviction Remedies and the Judicial Development of Kentucky
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42, 83 KY. L.J. 265 n.334 (1994-95) (discussing
generally the adoption of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure).
2 Act approved Mar. 22, 1962, ch. 234, 1962 KY. ACTS 788-847
3 See Gillig, supra note 1, at 334.
4Id.
5 See Douglas L. McSwain, Judicial v. Legislative Power in Kentucky: A
"Comity" ofErrors, 71 KY. L.J. 829,843 (1983). McSwain discusses the Kentucky
Supreme Court's "unsuccessful attempts" to resolve conflicts between legislative
enactments and court rules and policy. These attempts, according to McSwam,
have been driven by "comity." Id. at 830.
6See id. at 829. The Judicial Article was a series of amendments to Kentucky's
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in 1975, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky exercised rulemaking power.7
The Judicial Article created the Supreme Court of Kentucky, which now
possesses the ultimate authority to "prescribe rules governing its appellate
jurisdiction, rules for the appointment of commissioners and other court
personnel, and rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice."'
The Kentucky Constitution contains a separation-of-powers clause9
dividing government into executive, legislative, andjudicial branches, each
with supposedly equal power.1 This division of authority has two purposes:
"first, to prevent the aggregation of the basic powers of government in the
hands of a single individual, group or entity,"'1 and second, to divide
authority "among three, theoretically equal branches" in orderto "facilitate
the operation of government.. "12 The General Assembly hoped the
Judicial Article would lessen conflicts between the judicial and legislative
branches based on the separation-of-powers doctrine.13 As the Kentucky
Supreme Court observed; a potential advantage of approaching rulemaking
authority as a power held concurrently by the court and the legislature is
that constitutional confrontations between the two branches would be
deemphasized.14 Unfortunately, the hopes of the Kentucky General
Assembly and Supreme Court have not been realized. Some commentators
have observed that vesting rulemaking in the same body that interprets
those rules creates a potential for abuse.15 The alternative, separate bodies
for mlemaking and interpretation, yields inefficient and unwieldy
Constitution passed by voters in 1975 and enacted Jan. 1, 1976. The adoption of
the 1975 Judicial Article completely overhauled the Kentucky judicial system.
'See id.
'Id. at 829 n.6 (citing KY. CONST. § 116).
9 KY. CONST. § 27 Section 27 provides that "the powers of the government of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments
[t]hose which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another;,
and those which are judicial, to another." Id.
10 See Richard M. Frank, The Scorpions' Dance: Judicially Mandated
Attorney's Fees - The Legislative Response and Separation-of-Powers




'4 See Commonwealth v Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1987) (holding that
while the truth-m-sentencing statute violated Kentucky's separation-of-powers
provision, the doctrine was acceptable under the principle ofcomity); see generally
McSwain, supra note 5.
5 See McSwain, supra note 5, at 850.
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procedures for promulgating rules of court. This Note revisits the comity
issue by examining the supreme court's current policy for reviewing rules
of procedure under the doctrine of comity and suggests deviating from that
doctrine in the future to promote efficiency in rulemaking. 16
Part I introduces the concept of comity and describes the histoncal
underpinnings that led the court, in 1978, to adopt the principle in Exparte
Farley.17 Part ]I reviews the landmark case Commonwealth v. Reneer18 M
which the court confronted and upheld the truth-m-sentencing statute.19
Although the statute clearly violated the separation-of-powers doctrine as
set forth in the Kentucky Constitution, the court nevertheless upheld the
law as a reasonable intrusion on its rulemaking authority. Part III examines
three cases that further eroded the court's rulemaking authority- Huffv.
Commonwealth,0 Commonwealth v. Hubbard,2 and Boone v. Common-
wealth.? Part IV reviews the decisions in Drumm v. Commonwealth,21 Hall
v. Commonwealth,' and O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth?5 Finally, Part V looks at
the legacy left by Justice Charles M. Leibson concerning the court's
erosion, in the name of comity, of its own authority to promulgate rules of
practice and procedure and offers an opinion on possible paths the court
might take to reverse the tide.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT OF "COMITY"
Although Kentucky's supreme court has the explicit authority to
prescribe rules of practice and procedure in the courts of the Common-
16 This subject was ongmally addressed m McSwain, supra note 5.
17 Exparte Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1978).
18 Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1987).
19 See id. at 798.
20 Huffv. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. 1989); see infra notes 98, 99,
102, 106, 107, 121, 136.
21 Commonwealthv. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1989); see infra notes 108-
14, 121, 136.
'Boonev. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1989); see infra notes 96,97,
115-27, 130-36.
23 Drumm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1990); see nfra notes 111,
142, 145-53.
2 Hall v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1991), overruled by
Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1996); see infra notes 155-59.




wealth,26 it has long embraced the concept of "comity" Comity is defined
as "judicial adoption of a rule unconstitutionally enacted by the legislature
'not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect."' 27 The
Kentucky Supreme Court first established and announced its reliance on the
concept of comity as the ground for permitting legislative action on matters
of judicial concern m Exparte Farley.28
Farley involved a request by the Office of Public Advocacy, made
pursuant to section 532.075(6) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
("K.R.S."), to periodically inspect and copy records kept by the Admnms-
trative Office of the Courts ("AOC") in death penalty cases.29 The supreme
court held that the "Open Records Law," K.R.S. § 61.870 - .884, did not
apply to records in the AOC's hands until after the court had reviewed and
examined them.3° The court m Farley stated, "[W]e respect the legislative
branch, and m the name of comity and common sense are glad to accept
without cavil the application of its statutes pertaining to judicial matters
1531 Comity is, by nature, a purely discretionary action by the court. The
court has never felt the need to nullify all legislation that infringes upon its
rulemaking authority,32 but has engaged m an ex post facto analysis each
time the General Assembly speaks in the rulemaking arena.
There never has been a definitive line between the powers of the
legislative andjudiciary branches of government.3 Therefore, any standard
used to determine ifa legislative enactment is an unconstitutional violation
ofthe separation-of-powers doctrine must be subjective. The supreme court
has adopted such a subjective standard with its declaration that comity
should be applied when an exercise of "the legislative function" unreason-
ably interferes with "the functioning of the courts. 34
26See KY. CONST. § 116; supra text accompanying note 8.
27 O'Bryan, 892 S.W.2d at 577 (quoting BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 242 (5th
ed. 1979)).
2 Exparte Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617, 624 (Ky. 1978).
29 See id. at 620-21.
31 See id. at 627
311d. at 624.
32 See Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Ky. 1987).
33 See Frank, supra note 10, at 76 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (noting that "[t]he Framers of the [Kentucky]
Constitution indicated that the three branches of government 'were not intended to
operate with absolute independence"')) (footnotes omitted).
4 Exparte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 688 (Ky 1980). See
also Craig L. Farnsh, Restoration of the Collateral Source Rule in Kentucky: A
Review ofO'Bryan v Hedgespeth, 23 N. KY. L. REV 357, 363-69 (1996).
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This standard has been used since the Farley decision m 1978.11 It
frequently has been attacked as hypocritical, particularly by the late Justice
Leibson. For example, in hIs dissent in Commonwealth v. Reneer, Justice
Leibson asserted that K.R.S. § 532.055, the truth-m-sentencing statute,
36
blatantly violated the separation-of-powers doctrine.3" For Justice Leibson,
the comity that supported the statute was "'A Comity of Errors."',3 Justice
Leibson viewed comity as a way to appease the legislature. In his view, the
court grasped for ways to avoid striking down legislation infringing upon
the judiciary's rulemakng authority, usually by invoking the comity
doctrine.39 Unfortunately, this worked to erode the very authority the
judiciary was attempting to assert.
II. COmMONWEALTH V RENEER: INTO THE ABYSS
The case of Commonwealth v. Reneer, in which the Kentucky Supreme
Court upheld the recently enacted truth-m-sentencing statute, provided a
clear test of the boundaries of legislative mfrimgement on the court's
rulemaking authority I0 The statute dictated a new procedure for criminal
sentencing by which the jury would determine the sentence as well as the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.4 The statute also set out evidentiary
guidelines for the prosecution and allowed the defendant to offer evidence
in mitigation.42 Although the defendant in Reneer was found not guilty of
the charges against him, the court granted the Commonwealth's motion for
certification of the law.43
While the court reiterated its authority to prescribe rules of practice and
procedure in Kentucky's courts and found the statute to be a per se-
violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine, it nevertheless held that the
statute was not an unreasonable intrusion into the court's junsdiction.4 The
majority held the statute was procedural in nature, not dealing with the
31 See McSwam, supra note 5, at 832.
36 KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (Mchie 1990); see mfra note 41.
"See Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 799 (Leibson, J., dissenting).38Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
3See id. at 798-805 (Leibson, J., dissenting).40 See id. at 794.
41 See KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 532.055(l)-(2) (Miclue 1990) ("In all felony
cases, the jury will make a determination of [guilt or innocence]" and" the
jury will determine the punishment to be imposed. ").
42 See id. § 532.055(2)(a)-(b).
43 See Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 798.
4' See id. at 797
1997-98]
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elements necessary to meet the substantive standard of proof of the crime
but merely setting forth sentencing guidelines.45 In a blistering dissent,6
Justice Leibson said the court had committed a major blunder. He asserted
that the "Court [had] elected to grant comity to a new law that effects
substantial changes m judicial procedure."47 Justice Leibson felt these
changes were "poorly conceived and constitutionally flawed."' He placed
responsibility for future problems squarely on the court's shoulders:
The new Judicial Article enacted m 1975 entrusted the Supreme
Court, notthe General Assembly, with exclusive powerto prescribe "rules
of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice" With the power to
act goes full responsibility for the action taken. It is our Court, not the
General Assembly, that has made KRS 532.055 the law of this Common-
wealth. In doing so we have disregarded the carefully thought-out policies
and practices that our Court usually follows before adopting any major
change m the Rules of Criminal Procedure, including study by a select
committee of the bench and bar, and public hearing before the Kentucky
Bar Association. We have bypassed the safeguards that would have been
provided by study of these new procedures by professionals, and
embraced in their stead the very forces of precipitous change that the new
Judicial Article was designed to defuse.49
The majority analyzed provisions of K.R.S. § 532.055 to determine if
the statute constituted an "unreasonable encroachment" on the judiciary's
prerogatives." Subsections (1) and (2) require separate phases for ajury's
determination of guilt or innocence and for the penalty assessment.51 Since
this type of bifurcation had already been adopted for death penalty cases,
the majority believed that it was a reasonable method to reduce the time
involved in completing the trial process in other cases.5 2 It made the
41 See id. at 796.
"Justice Joseph Lambert joined in the dissent.
47 Id. at 799 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
41 Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
41 Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting) (quoting the 1975 Judicial Article).
-O0Id. at 797
"i See id. Subsection (2) provides:
Upon return of a verdict of guilty or guilty but mentally ill against a
defendant, the court shall conduct a sentencing hearing before the jury, if
such case was tried before ajury in the hearing the jury will determine the
punishment to be imposed within the range provided elsewhere by law.
KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 532.055(2) (Micle 1990).52See Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 797
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sweeping assessment that the jury's new-found power to decide whether
sentences would be served concurrently or consecutively was merely a tool
to give the jury a more complete picture of the crime, the defendant, and
the punitive goals behind sentencing before a sentence was rendered. 3
Similarly, the statute's guidelines for introduction of evidence relevant to
sentencing by the prosecution and defendant were also seen as an enabling
mechanism for the jury.' The majority completely glossed over the fact
that major changes in evidentiary procedures were made that should have
been within the court's own confines to amend. All of this was done in the
name of expediency.
Justice Leibson did not make the same mistake. In Ins assessment, the
concurrent/consecutive sentences determination directly conflicted with
existing procedures.55 Under K.R.S. § 532.1 1056 and Kentucky Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11.04, 7 this determination was vested solely with the
judge.58 The rationale behind this rule was simple: to prevent disparate
sentencing based on individual juries' passions.5 9 According to Justice
Leibson, the majority's opinion failed to consider the effect this change
would have on prison overcrowding, an effect that is exacerbated by K.R.S.
§ 439.3401, 6 which prescribed a minimum parole eligibility requirement
of fifty percent of the sentence imposed.6'
Second, Justice Leibson found the introduction of evidence regarding
mminiumparole eligibility, whichthe statute authorized, to beunworkable.
This was because "at the point where a convicted offender is turned over
to the Department of Corrections, the power to determine the period of
See id.
See id.
See id. at 799 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
56 Ky. REV STAT. ANN. § 532.110(1) (Michle 1990) ("The multiple sentences
shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court shall determine.").
57KY. 1. CRIM. P 11.04 ("The judgment shall state whether [the sentences] are
to be served concurrently or consecutively. The judgment shall be signed by the
judge.").
58See Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 799 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
59See id. (Leibson, L, dissenting).
60 KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 439.3401(3) (Miclhe 1990). Tius subsection of the
statute provides:
A violent offender who has been convicted of a capital offense or Class A
felony with a sentence of a term of years or Class B felony who is a violent
offender shall not be released on parole until he has served at least fifty
percent (50%) of the sentence imposed.
61 See Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 800 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
1997-98]
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incarceration passes completely to the Parole Board."62 Justice Leibson felt
that attempting to inform juries about the myriad parole eligibility options
would be futile.63
Third, Justice Leibson disagreedwith the statute's provisionpermitting
the prosecution to introduce, during the sentencing phase, evidence of prior
felony and misdemeanor convictions.4 There is no time limitation on
admissibility of prior offenses. 6 Justice Leibson asserted that "[tibis piling
up of prior convictions serves no purpose except to provide evidence that
will be utilized by the jury to enhance the sentence. It will exacerbate the
problems regarding extended warehousing of crimnals... "66
Fourth, Justice Leibson foresaw the possibility of running afoul of due
process by allowingthe prosecution to offer evidence concerningthe nature
of prior offenses.67 The statute allows prosecutors to introduce evidence of
the nature of prior offenses68 and allows the defendant the chance to offer
controverting evidence.69 Justice Leibson's concern was that the statute
established a post-conviction review mechamsm:
Evidence of the "nature" of a prior offense calls for reconsideration
of the evidence from the previous case. We can expect nothing less than
complete review because of subsection 2(b) winch permits the defendant
to introduce "evidence winch negates any evidence introduced by the
Commonwealth." Thus, both sides will be indulged at length on the
"nature" of a prior offense.70
Because the jury is allowed to engage in extensive post-conviction
review, it is likely that much extrinsic evidence will be presented, evidence
62Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
63See id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
6 See id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
65 id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
'Id. at 801 (Leibson, J., dissenting).67-See id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
(' See KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 532.055(2)(a)(2) (Michie 1990) ("Evidence may
be offered by the Commonwealth relevant to sentencing including the nature
of prior offenses for winch [the defendant] was convicted.").
" See id. § 532.055(2)(b) ("The defendant may introduce evidence in
mitigation. For purposes of this section, mitigating evidence means evidence that
the accused has no significant history of criminal activity winch may qualify him
for lemency.").70Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 801 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
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that was not admissible at the trial level." Also, any limitations on the
presentation of such evidence will be subject to due process scrutiny
Justice Leibson asserted that "unlike a [persistent felony offender]
proceeding, wherein no evidence is introduced regarding the 'nature' of the
offense, m the expanded circumstances now presented any effort to limit
the defendant's presentation of negating evidence, direct or indirect, has
serious Due Process implications."'
Fifth, the statute allows the Commonwealth to introduce evidence
about the possibility of parole. 3 Tis procedure is in direct conflict with
judicial precedent.74 The court had long held that the introduction of any
evidence concemingthepossibility ofparolewas prejudicial error, whether
m the guilt or innocence phase or the pumshment phase.75 Justice Leibson
was appalled at the majority's dispensing with precedent so easily- "With
a single hastily conceived stroke of the pen we will discard our previous
jurisprudence to invite speculation about the possibility of parole as a
central factor in the jury's yardstick to use in deciding an appropriate
pumshment." 76
Finally, Justice Leibson took issue with the statute's mandate for
combined sentencing and Persistent Felony Offender ("TFO") hearings."
The PFO hearing has a completely different set of evidentiary rules than
those articulated by the truth-in-sentencing statute. The rules for PFO
See id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
7 Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
See § 532.055(2)(a)(4) ("Evidence may be offered by the Commonwealth
relevant to sentencing including [t]he maximum expiration of sentence as
determined by the division of probation and parole for all such current and prior
offenses.").
74 See Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Ky. 1981) (stating that
"[t]he consideration of future consequences such as parole [has] no place m the
jury's finding of fact and may serve to distort it"); Broyles v. Commonwealth, 267
S.W.2d 73, 77 (Ky. 1954) (stating that "the parole of prisoners falls within another
department of government, and a discussion of the subject has no place in an
argument to ajury"); Boyle v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 711,712 (Ky. Ct. App.
1985) (stating that "the long-recognized rule m this jurisdiction has been that
neither the court nor prosecutor should mention to ajury that a defendant could be
paroled").
75 See Boyle, 694 S.W.2d at 712.
76Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 802 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
' See § 532.055(3) ("All hearings held pursuant to this section shall be
combined with any hearing provided for by KRS 532.080. This section shall not
apply to sentencing hearings provided for m KRS 532.025.").
1997-98]
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hearings are: (1) The nature of the prior conviction is not admissible in a
PFO proceeding; (2) Evidence regarding parole is not permissible in aPFO
proceeding; (3) The PFO statute requires a finding of fact by the jury that
the proof is sufficient to establish the previous conviction(s); (4) The PFO
statute contemplates that a sentence must first be set for the underlying
offense before any evidence is received regarding prior offenses; and (5)
When ajury finds an accused guilty as a PFO but is unable to agree on the
proper punishment, the judge may not impose the pumshment.78
Although the majority had no trouble with the idea of separating the
determination-of-guilt phase from the sentencing phase, Justice Leibson
argued that there was no way to prevent prejudice in such a proceeding,
even with comprehensive instructions to the jury-
There is no practical way that the jury can compartmentalize this
information so as to avoid prejudice in all three decisions: the penalty for
the underlying offense, the determination of guilt as a PFO, and the
enhanced penalty.. The multiple enhancement ofthe suggested hearing
is so fraught with prejudice that it should be considered fundamentally
offensive to the concept of justice.79
The system in place called for a PFO hearing only after the jury set a
punishment for the crime. 0 During the hearing, the jury would examine a
Presentence Report prepared by a probation officer, which would contain
information on the "defendant's history of delinquency or criinality,
physical and mental condition, family situation and background, economic
status, education, occupation, personal habits, and any other matters that
the court directs to be included."8' Justice Leibson expressed confusion
about whether the legislature intended the truth-m-sentencmg statute to
replace the existing procedures. 82 If so, then much of the information
contained in the Presentence Report would be unavailable to the jury
because it was not permitted by the current rules of evidence. 3 If not, then
there would be serious potential to prejudice the defendant's due process
rights if he was not allowed to present evidence to contradict the mforma-
tion contained in the Presentence Report.84 Even if mitigating evidence
78 See Commonwealth v. Crooks, 655 S.W.2d 475,476-77 (Ky. 1983).
79 Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 803 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
8oSee id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
81KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 532.050(2) (Miclue 1990).
82See Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 803 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
83See id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).84See id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
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were allowed, the proceeding could become so unwieldy as to "destroy the
[sentencing] system."85 Justice Leibson thought these were serious
concerns that should have been more thoroughly addressed by the majority
before the statute was upheld under the prnciple of comity 
86
Justice Leibson further bolstered his argument by finding that the
statute's provisions ran afoul of the Bill of Rights87 in the Kentucky
Constitution." In section 2, Kentucky's Constitution protects its citizens
from deprivation of their right to due process, and states that "[a]bsolute
and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists
nowhere m a republic, not even m the largest majority "8 9 Justice Leibson
felt that a statute demanding that juries engage m speculation and post hoc
review, and commingling separate and distinct proceedings, was "an
obvious and flagrant violation of our Bill of Rights, § 2."90 Ultimately, he
saw the truth-m-sentencing statute as "an exercise of arbitrary power and
a demal of due process [that] should have been struck down as such" rather
than "enacted into law by our grant of comity when the General Assembly
is admittedly powerless to mandate such judicial procedures."9'
With Reneer, Justice Leibson established himself as the voice of
restraint when it came to allowing the legislature to engage in rulemaking.
The court, in its haste to grant comity to legislative encroachments into its
exclusive territory, opened the door to further legislation setting out rules
of procedure. 2
III. FOUR STEPS DOWN THE PATH:
POST-RENEER DEVELOPMENTS
"Whis court has the power to preempt the statute by the promulgation
of different rules of procedure at any time we determine it necessary "93
This statement, although a forceful assertion of jurisdiction, has had little
s1 Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting). Justice Leibson believed that if this type of
evidence was allowed into the sentencing phase, the proceedings would become
long and complicated. See id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
16 See id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
7 Ky. CONST. §§ 1-26.
" See Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 804 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
89KY. CONST. § 2.
o Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 804 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
9tId. (Leibson, J., dissenting).




practical effect m the post-Reneereraf4 Various legislative enactments that
changed the jury's function m sentencing procedures and altered eviden-
tiary standards have been upheld based on the principle of comity. The
result has been a steady erosion of the judiciary's rulemaking authority,
particularly m establishing sentencing procedures.9 5
Reneer was the first step down this path. As Justice Leibson wrote in
his dissent in Boone v. Commonwealth:9
In Chapter I of our judicial consideration of this new "Truth-m-
Sentencing" legislation, we held that KRS 532.055 is unconstitutional, an
"encroachment by the General Assembly upon the prerogatives of the
Judiciary." Then we made a fundamental mistake misapplying the
"principle of comity" to adopt these far reaching procedural changes,
despite the statute's unconstitutionality, as a substitute for our existing
procedure covering the same subject matter. Thus, with a stroke of a pen
we threw out our own sentencing procedure, pamstaking[ly] developed
in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and case precedent 97
Huff v. Commonwealth98 was the second step towards an erosion of
judicial rulemaking authority In Huff, the sentencing procedure under
K.R.S. § 532.055, in which evidence of minimum parole eligibility can be
shown to the jury, was attacked as an unconstitutional infringement of due
process." Kentucky courts had long barred discussion of parole eligibility
m the sentencing phase. The 1917 case of Postell v. Commonwealth10
articulated the fundamental principle behind this prohibition: "The jury's
verdict [on sentencing] should not be influenced by what another depart-
ment of the state government might or might not do, or had authority to do.
It is to be guided only by the facts pertaining to the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and the law applicable thereto. '01
Justice Leibson argued mHuffthat the introduction ofinimum parole
eligibility evidence was in direct conflict with longstanding precedent and
should not be allowed because it was speculative by nature and concerned
94 See id. at 794.
95 See znfra notes 97-135 and accompanying text.96 Boone v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1989).
97 Id. at 617 (quoting Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 797-98).
9 8 Huffv. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. 1989).
99 See id. at 106.
100 Postell v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W 39 (Ky. 1917), overruled inpart by
Powell v. Commonwealth, 123 S.W.2d 279 (Ky 1938).
o1Id. at 44, quoted in Huff, 763 S.W.2d at 111 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 86
"COMITY" REVISITED
"a matter which is inherently vague and unknowable, and subject to
subsequent change."'" The majority had used the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Californa v. Ramos'03 to justify its positionY°4 In
Ramos, the court instructed the jury on the differences between death, life
imprisonment without parole, and life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole. 05 Justice Leibson dismissed the majority's reasoning because it
dealt with a much narrower issue.1°6 He observed that a 'jury required to
choose between the death penalty and a sentence to life without possibility
of parole or a sentence where parole is possible, is necessarily told that
parole is a prospect."' 07
The third step toward erosion of judicial rulemaking authority was
Commonwealth v. Hubbard,08 which posited the question of whether
making ajudge the ultimate authority in case ofjury gridlock, as the truth-
rn-sentencing statute did, was a violation of the due process clause of the
United States Constitution."° The majority held that allowing the judge to
fix the penalty was constitutional, although it was a departure from
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.84,110 which mandates jury
sentencing."' Justice Leibson again dissented, construing the exception to
jury sentencing in Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.84112 as not
applicable to "an unconstitutional statute that only has the force of 'law'
after we [chose] to give it 'comity "'113 Again, Justice Leibson urged the
court to stop "adhering blindly to a rle created by an unconstitutional
legislative incursion into thejudicialrule-makmg process" and overturn the
truth-m-sentencing statute."
4
102 Huff, 763 S.W.2d at 111 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
103 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
1o4 See Huff, 763 S.W.2d at 107
" See Ramos, 463 U.S. at 992.
10 6 See Huff, 763 S.W.2d at 112.
107 Id.
'0 Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1989).
109 See id. at 883.
110 KY.R. lCRIM. P 9.84(1) ('When the jury returns a verdict of guilty it shall
fix the degree of the offense and the penalty except that the court may fix the
penalty (a) in cases where the penalty is fixed by law and (b) in cases where the
court is otherwise authorized by law to fix the penalty.").
" See Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d at 884.
112 Ky R. lCRIM. P 9.84(1).





Justice Leibson's prediction of problems involving due process
considerations was actualized m Boone v. Commonwealth."' The question
for the court was the admissibility of a defendant's evidence concerning
minimum parole eligibility.116 After the defendant was convicted on
sodomy and sexual abuse charges, but before the sentencing phase, the
Commonwealth declinedto offer evidence ofmininmum parole eligibility.117
The defendant sought to introduce evidence showing that "[u]nder KRS
439.340 1, [h]e would be considered a violent offender and thus required to
serve a mimmum of 50% of his sentence."' 18 The supreme court agreed
with Boone "that to place tius phase of the [jury's] enlightenment solely in
the hands of the prosecutor is a denial of due process to [him] or any other
defendant. 119
Justice Leibson, although agreeing with the majority that this was adue
process violation, wanted to take it a step further and invalidate the entire
statute, 20 as he had sought to do m Reneer, Huff, and Hubbard.' He took
exception to the majority's "'ad hoc procedural rule-making"' and
proposed areturn to the court's formerpractices, complete with" 'elaborate
safeguards' 9%12
Instead of responding by rejecting a rule which is patently unaccept-
able, we elect to write a new rule in this Opinion that both sides may
now introduce evidence regarding minimum parole eligibility. [T]he
new rule is a fatal injury to the rulemaklng processes developed by our
Court to insure appropriate and orderly changes in the Rules of Crnmial
Procedure, processes essential to insure both quality and legitimacy."n
To Justice Leibson, the Boone holding was the last straw The court had
construed the statute even more broadly than m the past.124 By reading the
statute to give both sides the ability to introduce evidence regarding
15 Boone v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1989).




20 See id. at 619 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
"I See Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1987); supra notes 47-
48, 54-92 and accompanying text; Huff v. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 106 (Ky.
1989); supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text; Commonwealth v. Hubbard,
777 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1989); supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
112 Boone, 780 S.W.2d at 618 (Leibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Hubbard, 777
S.W.2d at 887 (Leibson, J., dissenting)).
123 Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
12 See id. at 618 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
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sentencing, the court was engaging in rulemaking without the procedural
safeguards of the past. 1' Tis inference was justified, in the majority's
opinion, on the ground that "'the inconvenience of a bifurcated trial is a
small price to pay for a better informed sentencing process."'
Even more disturbing was the majority's recognition that "[m]uch of
the trouble which arises in the sentencing procedure would be eliminated
byjudicial sentencing." 127 Certainly if the court believed this, it had every
right to change Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.84,2 which
provides for jury sentencing, under its exclusive right to "prescribe
rules of practice and procedure."
129
Justice Leibson was further appalled by the majority's willingness to
so readily extend the statute's reach:
This is a giant step beyond Reneer and Huff where we adopt the
General Assembly's sentencing procedure m place of our own 'under the
principles of comity' because the present rule change does not adopt the
statute. On the contrary, the rule change mandated in this Opinion adds to
and conflicts with the statute .In sum, we are rending the fabric of our
judicial process in an unprecedented manner to the save a bad rule by
extending it. The damage to our rulemaking process from this precedent
may be irreparable.130
Justice Leibson also took exception to the majority's comment that
judicial sentencing would solve "the trouble which arises in [tins]
sentencing procedure."'3 He chastised the majority for its "ill-advised and
unnecessary" remark and reasoned that there was "no morejustification for
a judge to consider the vagaries and uncertainties of parole eligibility in
fixing an appropriate sentence than there is reason for a jury to do so.1132
There shouldbe no consideration, according to Justice Leibson, of whether,
and if so when, a defendant will be granted parole. 133 Rather, he thought it
was time "for our General Assembly to deal with the problems created by
,25 See id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
'26 Id. at 616 (quoting Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 797).
127 Id.
17 KY. R. CRIM. P 9.84(1); see supra note 110.
29 KY. CONST. § 116.
130 Boone, 780 S.W.2d at 618 (Leibson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added) (quoting Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 797).
131 Id. at 616.
13 2 Id. at 618 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
133 See id. at 619 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
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'our present unwieldy and unworkable parole system that has destroyed
credibility andpublic confidence m criminal sentencing.'1 34 Inis opinon,
the majority's holding, which sought to combine the executive function of
parole consideration with the judicial function of sentencing, "[made]
matters worse. 135
Throughout the course of the 1988-89 term of the Kentucky Supreme
Court, Justice Leibson sought in vain to demonstrate to the other members
of the court how they had weakened their own rulemaking authority,
possibly irreparably. 36 Although ns pleas fell on deaf ears, he did not give
up the fight. Future cases provided hun with other forums in which to
reiterate his views and try to stop the rulemaking process from sliding into
chaos.137
IV. DRUMM, HALL, AND O'BRYAN: COMITY EXTENDED
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Kentucky decided Drumm v. Common-
wealth 13 adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4),13 which provides a
hearsay exception for statements made by a patient to a physician for the
purpose of medical diagnosis or istory 14 In so doing, it found K.R.S. §
421.355, which makes "a child victim's out-of-court statements regarding
physical or sexual abuse admissible in any criminal or civil proceed-
mg,14 to be "an unconstitutional exercise of judicial rule-making power
by the General Assembly "4
13 Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Reneer, 734 S.W.2d at 800).
135 Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
136 See Commonwealthv. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1989); supra note 111
and accompanying text; Huff v. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. 1988);
supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text; Boonev. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d
615 (1989); supra notes 96, 115-35 and accompanying text.137 See notes 112-50, 155-72 and accompanying text.
38 Dmmm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1990).
139 FED. R. EvID. 803(4) The rule provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rules, even though the
declarant is available as awitness: statements made forpurposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, parn, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the
cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis
or treatment.
140 See Drumm, 783 S.W.2d at 380.141 KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 421.355(1) (Baldwin 1986).
142Drumm, 783 S.W.2d at 382.
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This was a victory for Justice Leibson in that three other justices,
William M. Gant, Joseph Lambert, and Donald C. Wintersheimer, joined
m his opinion. 43 Drawing on the court's opinion in Gaines v.
Commonwealth,'" Leibson found that "the present statute transgress[es]
established procedure relating to the competency of children to testify as
witnesses, usurp[s] the power of the judiciary to control procedure, and
violate[s] Sections 27 and28 ofthe Constitution ofKentucky "1 45 The court
declined to extend comity to the statute "because it fail[s] the test of a
'statutorily acceptable' substitute for current judicially mandated
procedures."'" Justice Leibson found that the statute, although it adopted
the philosophy of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4),147 nonetheless
oversteppedthe boundaries of legislative rulemaking because the Kentucky
Rules of Evidence did not include a similar hearsay exception.'" The
court's method of adopting the federal rule into the state rule necessarily
made the statute constitutional. 49 The case was reversed and remanded so
the trial court could evaluate the evidence consistently with the court's
opinion.
150
Interestingly, Justice Roy N. Vance dissented, citing reasons remins-
cent of Justice Leibson's thoughts inReneer, Huff, Hubbard, andBoone.15'
Justice Vance believed Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4)"52 was too hastily
adopted. He asserted:
We have not heard argument on the question, and the adoption of a new
rule ofevidence in tins manner flies squarely m the face of our announced
policy submitting the proposed adoption of rules to a discussion by the
members of the Kentucky Bar Association before they are adopted. 3
'43 See id. at 386.
I" Gaines v. Commonwealth, 728 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1987) (declaring K.R.S. §
421.350 unconstitutional as an infringement on the inherentpowers ofthejudiciary
because it allowed a child who had not been found competent to testify).
145 Drumm, 783 S.W.2d at 382.
'4Id. (quoting Gaines v. Commonwealth, 728 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Ky. 1987)).
147 FED. R. EVID. 803(4); see supra note 139.
141 See Drumm, 783 S.W.2d at 382.
14 See id. at 384; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(4) and supra note 139 (KY. P,
EviD. 803(4) and FED. R. EVID. 803(4) are identical).
150 See Drumm, 783 S.W.2d at 3 85-86.
151 See supra notes 121, 96, 98, 115-35 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
53Drumm, 783 S.W.2d at 386 (Vance, J., dissenting).
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ChiefJustice Robert F Stephens and Justice Dan Jack Combs jomed m this
dissent. M4
In 1991, the court decided Hall v. Commonwealth,15 5 once again
evaluating provisions ofK.R.S. § 532.055, the Tmth-m-Sentencmg statute.
The question in Hall was whether evidence offered by the Commonwealth
during the sentencing phase must meet Kentucky Rules of Evidence
requirements for competency. !56 The majority found that backward
evidence utilized in the sentencing phase essentially was not subject to the
requirements of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence.157 However, Justice
Leibson believed that this type of evidence was "full of hearsay, rumor,
speculation and opimon" and was madmissible m any phase of a jury
trial.5 8 He wanted to apply the "competent evidence" standard159 set forth
m Commonwealth v. Willis'60 and Hobbs v. Commonwealth.1
6'
Finally, in O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth,'6 the court struck down K.R.S. §
411.188 as unconstitutional. This statute allowed parties who held
subrogation rights to plaintiffs' awards to be notified of collateral source
payments made to those plaintiffs, and allowed evidence of collateral
payments to be admissible in civil trials. (Before the statute was enacted,
collateral payments were deemed irelevant. 163) Writing the opinion for a
unanimous court, Justice Leibson asserted that "[r]esponsibility for
deciding when evidence is relevant to an issue of fact which must be
judicially determined falls squarely within the parameters of 'practice
and procedure' assigned to the judicial branch. 1)164 The court was
concernedthat information regarding collateral payments was not "relevant
'54See id.
'5 Hall v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1991), overruled by
Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1996).
156 See id.
157 See id. at 229-30.
i' Id. at 231 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
159 See id.
"6 Commonwealth v. Willis, 719 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1986) (holding that a
certified copy of a driving history record was not sufficient to prove a prior
conviction for DUI because the best evidence of prior convictions is thejudgment
setting out the conviction).
161 Hobbs v. Commonwealth, 655 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1983) (holding that a
certified copy of ajudgment of conviction is necessary to prove the date or fact of
previous offenses in PFO hearings).
162 O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1995).
' 63 See id. at 573, 576.
164Id. at 576 (quoting KY. CONST. § 116).
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evidence" (as defined in Kentucky Rule of Evidence 401165) with respect
to determining a plaintiffs nght to recover for injury " It declined to
extend comity to the statute because the provision did "nothing to enhance
the jury's fact-finding function,"167 thus failing to meet the standard
articulated in Reneer I
Further, the court found that the statute "functions to confuse the jury
regarding the factual issue rather than to assist the jury in deciding the
damages incurred ss169 The court overruled the Court of Appeals'
decision in Edwards v. Land,70 which found K.R.S. § 411.18811' to be
constitutional based on comity."
V THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE
LEIBSON'S VIEWS ON RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
The case law after Reneer has been a scattering of opinions on the
constitutionality of the General Assembly's forays into procedural
rulemaking.11 There are no clear-cut guidelines for determining which
statutes will be found constitutional, which will be held unconstitutional
but granted comity, and which will be found unconstitutional and
overturned. As previously noted, the court upheld, in Reneer, the General
Assembly's complete revamping of the Commonwealth's sentencing
procedures, but, m O'Bryan, struck down a statute that would have allowed
collateral source payments to be revealed to those holding subrogation
165 KY. R. EVID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination ofthe action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.").
166 See 0 'Bryan, 892 S.W.2d at 576.
167 Id. at 577
16 Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794,798 (Ky. 1987). UnderReneer,
a legislatively prescribed procedure is permissible if it facilitates rather than
impairs judicial functions. See supra notes 40-92 and accompanying text.
169 0 'Bryan, 892 S.W.2d at 578.
170 Edwards v. Land, 851 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
although K.R.S. § 411.188 may encroach upon the powers of the judiciary, it does
not interfere unreasonably with the functionig of the courts), overruled by
O'Bryan, 892 S.W.2d at 578.
171Ky. REV STAT. ANN. § 411.188 (Michie 1990).
1uSee Farrish, supra note 34, for a discussion of O'Bryan.
,73See supra notes 98-172 and accompanying text.
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rights.7 Although both decisions pertained to changes m evidentiaryrules,
the court came down on opposite sides of the fence regarding their
legitimacy. Decisions like these, with no apparent rhyme or reason, provide
fodder for the legislature to continually tweak the rules of practice and
procedure. Without Justice Leibson (who died in 1995) as a bulwark
against these infringements on the judiciary's rulemaking authority, it is
uncertain what avenues the General Assembly will pursue in the future. It
is conceivable that even more daring incursions will be attempted.
Justice Lambert, who joined in many of Justice Leibson's dissents,
most notably in the Reneer'75 decision, may possibly take up the mantle of
protectingjudicial authority, although his views are still unclear. Hejomed
in the dissent in Hufft 76 but voted with the majority in Hubbard1" and
concurred in the result only in Boone.178 He alsojoined Justice Leibson and
the majority in O'Bryan.7 9 From these opinions, it is difficult to divine
what philosophy he will follow in future decisions.
The death of Justice Leibson has left a significant void in the court, a
void that hopefully will be filled by another strong voice in support of the
judiciary's exclusive right to promulgate rules ofpractice andprocedure for
the Commonwealth. Until such time as the court embraces that philosophy,
the legacy of Reneer will be further attempts by the General Assembly at
ad hoc rulemaking and confusion in the lower courts regarding the
Supreme Court's actions each time a statute is challenged.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court should scale back its application
of comity and restore the judiciary's exclusive rulemaking authority
Anything less will demean the efforts of the Supreme Court and Kentucky
Bar Association to engage in thoughtful, careful modification or enhance-
ment of the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, as well as the Rules of
Evidence. Leaving rulemaking to the political whims of the legislative
branch will continue to wreak havoc on our system of justice and will
seriously undermine the doctrines of equal protection and due process. This
Note has attempted to provoke discussion on the merits of exclusive
judicial rulemaking authority
174 See supra notes 40-45, 162-72 and accompanying text.
175 Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1987).
116 Huffv. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. 1988).
177 Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1989).
178 Boone v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1989).
17 9O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1995).
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Access Denied:
The Prison Litigation Reform Act
BY SIMONE SCHONENBERGER!
I. INTRODUCTION
risoners constitute a relatively small portion ofthe United States
population.I Yet, the prisonpopulation generates between fifteen
percent and twenty-three percent of all civil lawsuits filed m the
federal courts.2 As a consequence, the nation spends a disproportionate
amount ofjudicial and financial resources dealing with such cases.3 Many
of these claims are frivolous.4 And since most prisoners are indigent,
taxpayers fund the majority oftheir claims from the initial filing to the final
adjudication. Taxpayers are understandably frustrated by this significant
financial burden.5
In a legislative attempt to remedy the high profile problem of prisoner
lawsuits,6 Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act7 ("PLRA")
J.D. expected 1998, Umversity of Kentucky.
In 1996, 1,182,169 prisoners were in federal or state prisons in the United
States. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison Statistics
(last modified Aug. 7, 1997) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pnsons.htm>
2 See Gail L. Bakaitis DeWolf, Note, Protecting the Courts from the Barrage
of Frivolous Prisoner Litigation: A Look at Judicial Remedies and Ohio's
Proposed Legislative Remedy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 257 (1996); Curbing Prison
Litigation, WASH. POST, May 13, 1996, at A16.
I According to the National Association of Attorneys General, states spend
approximately $81 million ayear on prisoner lawsuits. Review and Outlook, WALL
ST. J., June 10, 1996, at Al8.
4 See DeWolf, supra note 2, at 257
S"Each case can represent thousands of taxpayer dollars wasted "
Testimony of Sarah Vandenbraak; Former Lead Counsel for the Philadelphia
District Attorney, Before the Judiciary Comm. of the U.S. Senate [hereinafter
Testimony ofSarah Vandenbraak], F.D.C.H., available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL
556529 (Sept. 25, 1996).
6 See, e.g., Review and Outlook, supra note 3, at Al8 (expressing the "public's
wish to lock up crtminals and throw away the key").
7 Prison Litigation Reform Act, PL 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-73 (codified as
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in April, 1996. While decreasing the number of frivolous lawsuits may be
a laudable goal, significantly limiting prisoners' access to the courts risks
infringement of their constitutional rights. The constitutionality of some of
the provisions included in the PLRA is questionable.8 Despite the real
financial burden caused by prisoner litigation, "the cost of protecting a
constitutional right cannot justify its total demal."9 Ultimately, no public
good is served by subordinating the constitutional rights of certain
individuals, even unsympathetic ones, to an otherwise laudable goal.
The purpose of tins Note is to analyze the constitutionality of the
PLRA reforms of the in forma paupens statute 0 with regard to terms of
access to the courts." The in forma paupens statute enables mdigent
individuals to file petitions with the court despite their inability to pay the
filing fee.12 The statute was "designed to ensure that indigent persons
would have meaningful access to federal courts."'3 Before the enactment
of the PLRA, the filing fee was waived for prisoners who demonstrated
their mdigent status. 4 There was no limit to the number of times a single
prisoner could take advantage of the waiver. The current version of the in
forma paupens statute replaces the waiver system with an affordable
repayment plan for indigent prisoners. In addition, it numerically limits
prisoners' use of the statute."
Part II ofthis Note will trace the historical development of a prisoner's
right of access to the courts. Part I will introduce the informa paupens
statute. Next, Part IV will evaluate the constitutionality of the PLRA's
changes regarding the payment of filing fees by mdigent prisoners. Part V
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1996)).
8 Criticism of the Act is not limited to its questionable constitutionality. Groups
such as the National Prson Project of the American Civil Liberties Union are also
concerned with the PLRA's effect on the humane treatment ofprsoners. The group
womes that the PLRA will "interfer[e] with the federal courts' power to address
truly horrifying conditions."Pinson Suits Address Honm)zng Conditions, WALL ST.
J., July 12, 1996, at A13.
9 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977).
1028 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994).
I" Although the PLRA reformed many aspects of the prison litigation process,
this Note will evaluate only the constitutionality of the modifications to the m
forma paupers statute.
12 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
13 Jody L. Sturtz, Comment, A Prisoner's Pnvilege to File In Forma Pauperis
Proceedings: May it be Numerically Restricted?, 1995 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L.
REv 1349, 1358.
14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1994).
5See id. § 1915(g).
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will focus on the constitutionality of the PLRA's bar on a prisoner's right
to file in forma paupens after having previously filed three frivolous
lawsuits while incarcerated. 16 Finally, this Note will conclude that whereas
the former modification passes constitutional muster, the latter revision
does not.
H. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Three major United States Supreme Court cases have contributedto the
establishment and extension of the prisoner's right of access to the courts: 
17
Ex parte Hull,8 Johnson v. Avery, 9 and Bounds v. Smith.2° Initially, a
prisoner's right to access was defined in terms of physical access to the
courts only. In Hull, a prison regulation required that prisoners' habeas
corpus petitions must be approved by prison authorities before they could
be filed with the court." In other words, prison officials could and did
physically bar specific prisoner petitions from being filed. The Supreme
Court struck down this regulation because "the state and its officers may
not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ
of habeas corpus."
This physical right of access was extended in 1968 by Johnson.? The
prison regulation at issue prohibited prisoners from assisting fellow
inmates m the drafting oftheir legal documents. 4 Thus, the regulation was
unlike the Hull regulation because it did not physically bar any specific
petition from being filed. Nonetheless, the Johnson Court focused on the
actual effect of the regulation and struck it down as an unconstitutional
demal ofa prisoner's right of access to the courts. 5 The Court concentrated
on the regulation's impact on illiterate andnon-English-speakngpnsoners.
Since they were incapable of drafting petitions without the aid of a jail
house lawyer, the rule effectively "forb[ade] illiterate or poorly educated
prisoners" from filing habeas corpus petitions. 6 By basing its ruling on the
16 See id.
7 See Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1353.
18 Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546-(1941).
19 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
2o Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
21 See Hull, 312 U.S. at 548-49.
2 Id. at 549.
See Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1355.
4 See Johnson, 393 U.S. at 484.
,See id. at 485.
2 Id. at 487
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prohibitive effect of the regulation, the Court extended a prisoner's right of
access beyond the mere physical right to file a petition with the court. The
Constitution prohibits effective denial of the right of access as well as
actual denial of access.27
The final significant extension of prisoners' right of access to the
courts occurred m 1976 with Bounds.8 Unlike the Hull and Johnson cases,
at issue m Bounds was not what the prison had done, but rather what it had
failed to do. The prisoners alleged a denial of right of access because the
prison did not provide adequate legal research facilities. 9 Analyzing the
issue m terms ofthe right to a"reasonably adequate opportunity" to present
petitions to the court,30 the Court agreed with the prisoners and held that
failure to provide prisoners with adequate legal libraries resulted in a denial
of their "fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts." 3'
Recently, in Lewms v. Casey,32 the Supreme Court retreated from some
minor aspects of Bounds.3 It invalidated a district court order, which was
based on alleged Bounds violations involving Arizona prison libraries,
primarily due to insufficient actual injury suffered by the complainants,34
and refuted the idea that prisoners have a constitutional right to adequate
prison libraries, per se. Rather, libraries are a means to an end - court
access - and not an end in themselves. 5 In its lengthy analysis, however,
the Court reaffirmed the essence of Bounds as a guarantee of "the
capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions
of confinement before the courts."36 Prisoners' right of access, therefore,
survives tins recent challenge.
Although some constitutional rights of prisoners are restricted as a
consequence of their incarceration, the right of access to the courts is not
27 See id. at 485 ("[I]t is fundamental that access of prisoners may not be
demed or obstructed.").
2 See Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1356.29 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 818 (1977).
30 d. at 825.
31 Id. at 828.
32 Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).
33 The Supreme Court disclaimed the suggestion in the Bounds decision that
"the State must enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate
effectively once in court." Id. at 2181.
I Other reasons for the reversal stated by the Court include (1) failure to
adequately defer to the judgment of prison authorities; (2) the incredible
intrusiveness of the injunction; and (3) failure to take into account the views of
prison authorities. See id. at 2184-85.
35 See Id. at 2180.
361Id. at 2182.
[VOL. 86
THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
deemed conditional on an individual's freedom from umnpnsonment. 37 The
basis of the right is debatable:3 It has been identified as stemming from
either the First Amendment39 orthe Due Process Clause. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has "established beyond doubt that prisoners have a
constitutional right of access to the courts."'
I. THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUTE
Them formapaupens statute provides indigents access to the courts by
allowmg the poor to bypass the court filing fee based on their lack of
financial resources.42 While the Constitution does not specifically guarantee
an individual the right to file m forma paupens, the Court has "established
that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts."43
Thus, the State has an affirmative duty to ensure that prisoners have a
"reasonably adequate opportunity" to present theirgrievances to the court.44
Since the current filing fee of $120 for civil actions is beyond the reach of
many prisoners,45 an indigent prisoner has no "reasonably adequate
opportunity" to file with the court if he4 is demed financial assistance.47
Without the Statute, the poor prisoner would be effectively, if not
physically, barred from filing a petition with the court. "Since a vast
majority of inmates are mdigent, the constitutional right to access would
37 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977).
3 See Arguments Before the Court, Prisons and Jails, 64 U.S.L.W 3407, at
3409 (Dec. 12, 1995).
39See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (identifying the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution as the source of the right of access). The First
Amendment prohibits Congress from "abridging the rightof the people to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1376.
"See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821. The validity of Bounds has recently come under
criticism by Justice Clarence Thomas. In Ins concurring opinion in Lewis, Justice
Thomas questioned the validity of the foundation of Bounds. "Bounds forged a
right with no basis in precedent or constitutional text "Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at
2194-95.
42 See Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1351.
43Id. at 1349-50.
"ABounds, 430 U.S. at 825.
41 See Lyon v. Vande Krol, 940 F Supp. 1433, 1437 (S.D. Iowa 1996), appeal
dismissed, No. 96-3752, 1997 WL 638238 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 1997).
" For the sake of convemence, m this Note the masculine pronoun refers both
to the masculine and the feminine.
47Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825.
1997-981
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
be meaningless without the in forma paupens statute. ' 4S Therefore,
although in forma paupens filings are not specifically authorized by the
Constitution, they nonetheless are necessitated by prisoners' constitutional
right of access to the courts.
Additionally, according to the Court in Burns v. Ohlo,49 an indigent
prisoner's constitutional right to proceed in forma pauperis may also be
based on an equal protection clai. 50 Since the right of access to the courts
is arguably based on the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause,51 a prisoner may not be denied access to the courts based on his
lack of financial resources.52 InBurns v. Ohio, the defendant was convicted
of burglary m Ohio. After the appellate court affirmed his life sentence, he
unsuccessfully attempted to file an appeal with the Oino Supreme Court.5
Although that court recogmzedBurns' legitimate indigent status, it rejected
his request for m forma paupens status because it had a policy ofrequiring
full payment of the fee regardless of the financial resources of the person
filing.' The United States Supreme Court held for the indigent minate and
required that m forma pauperis status be granted. Since "[t]here is no
rational basis for assuming that indigents' motions for leave to appeal will
be less meritorious than those of other defendants[,] [i]ndigents must,
therefore, have the same opportunities to revoke the discretions of the
Supreme Court of Ohio.' 55
Nonetheless, the Constitution does not expressly contemplate in forma
paupens filings. Therefore, any program modification that continues to
"assure the indigent [prisoner] an adequate opportunity to present his
claims fairly"'56 would satisfy the constitutional demands met by the
original in forma paupens statute. Thus, "[e]ven though the in forma
paupens statute affects a prisoner's right to access, which is a constitutional
right, Congress may limit prisoner use of the statute without completely
denying such persons this constitutional right. 57
Before the 1996 PLRA modification, the in forma paupens statute
provided for a waiver of the filing fee for qualifying indigent prisoners.58
"8 Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1351.
49 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).50 See id. at 252.
51See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
52See Burns, 360 U.S. at 252.
53See id.
54 See id. at 254.
55 Id. at 257-58.
56 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974).
" Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1361.
58 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994).
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No repayment provision existed, and indigent status was the only factor
considered in granting the waiver.59 The most recent revision of the
payment system of the m formapaupens statute modifies the mechanics of
the statute, but its application does not effectively deny prisoners thewr
constitutionally mandated opportunity to petition the courts. However, the
addition of the three strikes-provision, 6 which denies a prisoner in forma
paupens status ifhe previously has made three frivolous in forma paupens
filings, does effectively deny prisoners access to the courts.1
IV THE ABOLITION OF THE FILING FEE WAIVER
The PLRA does not abolish in forma pauperis filings. However, the
Act does significantly transform the federal m forma paupens program.
Previously, the in forma paupens statute resembled a generous waiver of
the filing fee for indigent prisoners. After enactment of the PLRA, what
remains of the in forma paupens statute more closely resembles a strictly
enforced installment loan agreement.62
The revised statute demands more proof of a prisoner's indigent status
than was previously required. Specifically, the statute requires submission
of "a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional
equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period immediately preceding
the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal ,63 By itself tlus
additional paperwork is an obstacle too small to be considered an effective
barrier to access. More significantly, the revision also puts most prisoners
on an installment plan to pay the filing fee. Specifically, the statute now
requires:
[I]f a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal m forma
paupens, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of the filing
fee. The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial
payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of
20 percent of the greater of - (A) the average monthly deposits to the
prisoner's account; or (B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's
9 See id.
' See id. § 1915(g) (preventing a prisoner from bringing a civil action or appeal
if he has had three or more claims dismissed as "frivolous, malicious or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury").
61 See id.
62 Seezd. § 1915.
631 d. § 1915(a)(2).
1997-98]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint or notice of appeal."
In effect, this newly enacted repayment plan makes true prison in forma
paupens filings a thing of the past. Under the current rule, virtually every
prisoner will eventually pay for the filing fee out of his own pocket.65
By eliminating state funding for prisoner's claims and by complicating
the process through which prisoners must proceed, Congress clearly has
attempted to limit the number of prisoner lawsuits." In fact, since the
enactment of the PLRA, the courts have experienced an actual decrease in
the number of prisoner filings.67 However, the Constitution is not
necessarily violated sunply because the approach of the revised program
may have contributed to a decline in prisoner lawsuits. Providing an
effective disincentive to prisoner filings does not automatically qualify as
an unconstitutional restriction on a prisoner's right of access.
Since the right to file m forma paupens is not itself constitutionally
based, reformation of the statute, or even its complete elimination, is not
unconstitutional unless the resulting reformation or elimination effectuates
a denial of actual or meaningful access to the courts. Although filing a
claim is more difficult now, the process does not rise to the level of either
an actual or effective bar to access.
The PLRA modifications to the in forma paupens payment system do
not constitute a physical bar on a poor prisoner's right of access to the
courts because an alternative, affordable payment schedule is made
64 Id. § 1915(b)(1).
65For example, "a prisoner earning say $20 a month would pay $4 a month for
30 months to pay the $120 filing fee." Paul Wright, Prson Litigation Reform Act
Passed, PRIsON LEGAL NEWs, July 1996, at 4.
" See id. ("PLW has already received copies of orders from federal courts m
California, less than three weeks after passage of the PLRA, informing prisoner
litigants of the new fee requirements and asking the prisoners if they want to
voluntarily dismiss the action or continue to pay the fee. The wording of the order
makes it clear that the court would prefer the action be withdrawn.").
67 See Testimony of Sarah Vandenbraak, supra note 5:
Although it is too early to make definitive predictions, national statistics
from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts suggest a
promising reduction in prisoner lawsuits. From 1991 through 1995
prisoners lawsuits increased 47%, representing an average growth rate of
more than 10%peryear. For the first four months in 1996, this growth rate
continued. In June of 1996, the first full month where the courts
consistently applied the PLRA, there was a 10% decrease in prisoner civil
cases.
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available in lieu of the previous payment waiver. Even if the prisoner does
not have the requisite minimum in his prison account, the inmate may still
proceed with the claim.68 The payment will sunply be withdrawn once the
prisoner's account reaches the requisite level. Additionally, the statute
specifically stipulates that no prisoner shall be prevented from filing a suit
based on lack of financial resources.69 Therefore, these PLRA revisions of
in forma paupens filings cannot qualify as an absolute bar to physical
access to the courts as described in Hull. In Hull, once the prison officials
removed a prisoner's petition from consideration, the prisoner was
powerless to ensure that his petition would reach the court.70 The PLRA
modifications do not render an inmate powerless to ensure his petition will
reach the court. Action by the inmate, namely selecting the repayment plan
schedule, guarantees that his claim will reach the courts. Therefore, the
current reform does not deny prisoners access; it only requires them to pay
for it like everyone else.
On the other hand, the PLRA's effect on meanngfu~l access is less
clear. Bounds requires that a prisoner have not only physical access but also
"a reasonably adequate opportunity to present"his petitions to the court.7'
Without a legal research library, a prisoner is demed effective access
because he is without the means to draft his petitions.' Similarly, without
financial assistance, an indigent prisoner is demed effective access because,
although not barred from filing, he is without the means to pay the filing
fee. Therefore, if indigent prisoners were required to pay an unaffordable
filing fee up front, they would be demed a reasonable opportunity to
petition the court because the fee, and therefore access, would be beyond
their reach. The PLRA purports to give the indigent prisoner a viable
means by which to pay the fee by breaking the fee down into smaller
monthly payments. However, since many prisoners are indigent and earn
low wages,' filing under the terms of the new in forma paupens system
still imposes a substantial barrier.
Court-imposed barriers on in forma paupens filings are not at all
uncommon. Unlike the PLRA, however, such restrictions are usually
developed in response to specific, especially prolific petition-filing
68See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (1996).
6 See id. ("In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil
action or appealing a civil or crimmaljudgment for the reason that the prisoner has
no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.").
70 See Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 548 (1941).
7 'Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977).
72 See id.
73 See Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1351.
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prisoners and applied only to those prisoners. Since the actual effect of the
limitation on the individual's right of access is determinative, overly
restrictive orders, such as absolute bans on any future in forma paupens
filing, have not survived the test of constitutionality.7 4 However, other
court-adninstered restrictions, such as limiting the number of in forma
paupens filings a specific prisoner may make per month, have survived
constitutional review."
The PLRA is a congressionally imposed rather than a judicially
imposed restriction. It targets all indigent prisoners, rather than targeting
only especially litigious ones. Nonetheless, comparison ofthe PLRA to the
court-ordered restrictions provides guidance in evaluating the
constitutionality of these statutorily mandated changes to the PLRA. The
PLRA's abolition of the fee waiver more closely resembles the
constitutionally valid forms of court-imposed restrictions limiting indigent
filings than it does the unconstitutional forms.
This federal reform is unlike the overly restrictive order deemed
unconstitutional by the court mIn re Green.76 That order demed an indigent
prisoner, Clovis Green, meaningful access to the courts.' It was aimed
solely and specifically at Clovis Green, a prisoner who had filed over 600
complaints m federal and state courts during his decade of incarceration.7
In response to Green's abuse of the in forma paupens statute, the district
court absolutely denied Green the option of filing in forma paupens in the
future. 9 Not only did the court require Green to pay the filing fee up front,
but it also demanded Green pay an additional "$100 cash deposit as
security for costs" for each new petition he wanted to file with the court.8"
The circuit court acknowledged the incredible financial burden Green
had placed on the local courts, both recently and in the past, even
sympathizing with the lower court's plight.8 Nonetheless, the order was
74 See, e.g., In re Green, 669 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (amending a district
court order prohibiting Green from filing any new actions unless all fees had been
paid and a $100 security deposit had been made).
75 See, e.g., In re Davis, 878 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding an injunction
requiring Davis to obtain prior review of a complaint before it could be filed); In
re Tyler, 677 F Supp. 1410 (D. Neb. 1987) (limiting Tyler to one in forma
paupens filing per month).
76 See Green, 669 F.2d at 786.
"See id.
78S ee id. at 781.
71 See id.
80 Id.
8" See id. at 786 ("We sympathize with the frustration experienced by the
district court here as well as by other district courts deluged with Green's parade
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struck down as unconstitutional. 2 Financial burden on the court was not the
focus of a clatm of demal of access. Instead, the circuit court focused on
"the nature of the indigent litigant's claim and the extent to which the
challenged restriction or bamer (financial or otherwise) deprived that
litigant of 'meaningful access' to the courts."83 Similarly, the PLRA
modification must not be evaluated in terms of resultant financial gains to
the judicial system. The order provided Green no alternative to filing at his
own expense. Due to his indigence, he would be unable to pay the fee. 4
Therefore, although he was not physically barred from filing, for all
practical purposes, future filings were out of his reach. Since the order was
unlimited m scope, it effectuated a "total barrier."' 5 Therefore, it infringed
on Green's constitutionally protected right to meaningful access.
In contrast, the m forma paupens revisions to the waiver system
included m the PLRA do not result m an across-the-board, total bamer
against meaningfid access by indigent prisoners.8 6 The process has been
purposely complicated to discourage the filing of prisoner petitions, with
more paperwork to prove a prisoner's indigent status and ultimate payment
of the filing fee being required. Nevertheless, indigent prisoners may still
qualify for m forma pauperis status. Yet, even the court m In re Green
recognized that "a court may impose conditions upon a litigant - even
onerous conditions - so long as they are, taken together, not so
burdensome as to deny the litigant meaningful access to the courts."8" The
statute specifically states that "[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited
from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or crnmal judgment for
the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the
initial partial filing fee."88 The PLRA provides a feasible alternative to
paying the full cost of the filing fee up front, the crucial element missing
from the court's order in In re Green.
The Supreme Court has never defined meaningful access to mean free
and unlimited access. Rather it means access which, for all practical
purposes, is within a prisoner's grasp.8 9 The PLRA reform to the in forma
of pleadings, petitions, and other papers.").
12 See id.
83 Id. at 785.
8See id. at 786.
5 Id. at 785.
16 For discussion of the three strikes provision which does deny UEP status to
especially litigious prisoners, see infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
u Green, 669 F.2d at 786.
8828 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b)(4) (West Supp. 1997).
89See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct.
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paupens filing fee schedule provides indigent prisoners with a method for
circumventing the standard requirement of up-front payment of the
otherwise unaffordable fee. Thus, unlike the In re Green court order,90 this
PLRA reform utilizes a case-by-case evaluation of the individual's
financial capabilities, and m itself does not deny filing due to insufficient
funds. Although it may be unlikely that a prisoner will be able to file a
complaint without depleting Ins prison bank account, the extended period
over which the fee will be withdrawn allows even those prisoners with very
limited funds to finance the filing fee in small, affordable installments.9'
Admittedly, whether to file or not may now be a difficult decision for many
prisoners. Yet that decision, whether to make the sacrifice and pay for the
filing, is still m the hands of the individual, not the State. So too, then, is
the power to access the courts. To the contrary, however, the three-strikes
provision of the PLRA unconstitutionally strips prisoners of their power to
access the courts.
V. THE THREE STRIKES PROVISION
The boy who cried wolf lost credibility after crying wolf one too many
times. After many false alarms, the town disbelieved the boy's last
warning, although that time it was legitimate. Similarly, many prisoners
have, in effect, been crying wolf for years by flooding the courts with
frivolous litigation usually filed in forma paupens. For example, inmates
have filed- "charges of cruel and unusual pumshment for allowing a
prisoner's ice cream to melt, and similar charges for receiving creamy
peanut butter instead of crunchy." 2 Understandably, Congress and the
public are concerned about wasting precious judicial resources on such
claims. However, the abundance of frivolous claims does not negate the
reality that some claims are legitimate and indeed serious.93 Even ifa single
2174 (1996).
90 See Green, 669 F.2d at 786 ("First, the order does not purport to be and in
fact is not geared to discerning whether each claim presents a new nonfivolous
issue.").
9' See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994).
DeWolf, supra note 2, at 257-58.
9 According to Donald Specter, director of the Prison Law Office at San
Quentin, "[tihe lugh dismissal rate of prisoner lawsuits is not solely due to
frivolous filings, but to potentially valid claims that are thrown out for minute
procedural or technical reasons." Greg Moran, Cruel and Unusual: Where Does
Punishment End and Cruelty Begin?, SAN DiEGo UNION-TRIB., Aug. 9, 1996, at
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prisoner generates hundreds of frivolous claims, the possibility exists that
he will file a legitimate claim sometime m the future. In other words,
sometimes when prisoners cry wolf, there really is a wolf.
Although the Constitution as interpreted by the Court mBounds grants
all individuals meaningful access to the courts,' this right is perhaps most
crucial to prisoners, for the Constitution often acts as the only check on
inhumane prison conditions.95 Undeniably, "'over the years, civil rights
suits have become a powerful method to force nprovements in prisoner
medical care, legal access and mmate treatment,' "96 the necessity ofwhich
otherwise would have gone unnoticed. Abar specifically aimed at frivolous
claims can be justified. However, any reform that even occasionally also
bars a legitimate mmate claim from reaching the court should not be
tolerated simply because it targets illegitimate complaints most of the time.
The PLRA's most controversial reform to the m forma paupens statute
attempts to stem the tide of frivolous lawsuits by limiting successive suits
by especially prolific minmates who proceed m forma paupens. The reform
provides that:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal ajudgment in a
civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or
more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility,
brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical mjury.
97
Unlike the modification to the in forma paupens fee repayment
provision,9 this provision sinply goes too far. It effectively, if not
physically, denies prisoners their right of access to the courts as established
by the Supreme Court in Bounds.9
See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821.
95Elizabeth Alexander, Acting Director of the National Prisoner Project of the
ACLU, describes some horror stones that were addressed through the court system,
including the sexual assault of female prisoners and the abuse of children in a
training school. See generally Prison Suits Address Horrifying Conditions, supra
note 8.
96 DeWolf, supra note 2, at 271, quoted in Lee Fischer, Fighting Frivolous
Inmate Legislation, LAW & FACT, July/Aug., 1994, at A6.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (1994).
91 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
9Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817
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The right of access to the courts does not include the right to file
frivolous lawsuits."° "As a general matter, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the First Amendment right to petition to preclude government
imposed bars to the courts except m 'sham' situations."'' ° Thus, a statute
could constitutionally erect obstacles intended to bar frivolous lawsuits
from ever being filed or heard in court.
However, the PLRA does not solely implicate frivolous lawsuits.
Rather, the statute mdiscrimnately bars both meritless and meritorious m
forma paupens filings based on a prisoner's previous filing of three
lawsuits deemed frivolous by the courts. In other words, according to the
PLRA, if a prisoner files three lawsuits that are correctly dismissed as
frivolous, his fourth lawsuit would be barred without regard to the basis of
that fourth claim unless that prisoner were in danger of imminent serious
physical harm."° Since the PLRA rejects that fourth claim without review
as to its merits, the Act may bar non-frivolous law suits as well as frivolous
ones durng the remainder of a prisoner's incarceration. Therefore, the
Act's constitutionality must not be analyzed under the special and
unprotected category of frivolous lawsuits. Rather, it must be evaluated in
terms of a possible infringement of the constitutional right of access to the
courts as set forth m Exparte Hull, Avery, and Bounds. °3
Defenders ofthe PLRA correctlypoint out that targeted inmates are not
banned from filing claims, only from filing claims in forma paupens.
Indeed, the PLRA does not deny inmates physical access to the courts.
However, despite the assertion that "there is no reason to believe that all
prisoners cannot afford the fee," I" demal of m forma pauperis status
effectively, if not physically, demes many indigent prisoners access to the
courts. Although the Constitution does not specifically provide a right to
file in formapaupens, theBounds guarantee of effective access necessitates
100 See Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 208 (10th Cir. 1981).
01 DeWolf, supra note 2, at 280. "This notion has been articulated through a
series of cases, establishing what has been called the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine."
Id., see, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965);
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
02 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
o3 Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817; see supra Part II.
104 Lyon v Vande Krol, 940 F Supp. 1433, 1437 (S.D. Iowa 1996), appeal
dismissed, No. 96-3752, 1997 WL 638238 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 1997).
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a system offinancial aid for the indigent.° 5 Just as "prison law libraries and
legal assistance programs are not ends in themselves," so too is in forma
paupens status not an end in itself, "but only the means for ensuring 'a
reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of
fundamental constitutional rights to the courts."'106
Some court-imposed numerical restrictions on a prisoner's in forma
paupens status, and consequently on that prisoner's access to the courts,
have withstood constitutional scrutiny 07 For example, min re Tyler,08 the
court limited Tyler to a single m formapaupens lawsuit per month./°9 Tyler
was an especially prolific and creative petitioner.10 The court therefore
considered, but ultimately rejected, completely barring Tyler from future
in forma pauperis filings."' Like most prisoners he was indigent and
therefore "if he were to be prohibited from proceeding in forma paupens
in any case, his access to this court would be totally denied."'
On the other hand, the court concluded that limiting Tyler to one in
forma paupens filing per month would curb the number of petitions he
could file while still allowing him his constitutionally protected access to
the courts. The Tyler restriction is not an unconstitutional demal of access
because "in the event Mr. Tyler has serious claims to assert, he may still
assert them, albeit with some delay ,,113 Moreover, "the most urgent of ins
claims can still be presented to this court, at the rate of one in forma
paupens filing per month.""' 4
The existence of Tyler-type restrictions on in forma paupens filings
supports the idea that there is no "unconditional right to proceed [in forma
paupens].'1 1 5 Yet the PLRA attack on the in forma paupens filings of
105 See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821-22. "[I]n order to prevent 'effectively
foreclosed access,' indigent prisoners must be allowed to file appeals and habeas
corpus petitions without payment of docket fees." Id. at 822 (quoting Bums v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959)).
1 Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174,2180 (1996) (quotingBounds, 430 U.S. at
825).
See Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1364-67
In re Tyler, 677 F Supp. 1410 (D. Neb. 1987).
See id.
See id. (noting that Tyler filed 113 lawsuits between January 1, 1986 and
August 25, 1987).
"I See id. at 1413.112,1d.
113 Id. at 1414.
114 Id.
I's Lyon v. Vande Krol, 940 F Supp. 1433, 1438 (S.D. Iowa 1996), appeal
dismissed, No. 96-3752, 1997 WL 638238 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 1997).
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prolific prisoners is not, as suggested by PLRA supporters, "smilar to the
federal courts' inherent power to limit inmates' abuse of the courts."
' 16
Yler's limitation and other similar court-ordered restrictions survive
constitutional scrutiny in part because they are individual responses to a
particular litigant.117 On the other hand, the PLRA provision burdens access
to an entire class of prisoners, the indigent, without respect to the particular
circumstances involved."'
Additionally, the one-per-month limit ensures that Tyler will never be
at risk for losing is claim permanently. However, since many prisoners are
indigent and simply cannot afford the filing fee, under the PLRA reform
prisoners will conceivably lose their legitimate claims forever due to the
statute of limitations. In her Comment, A Prisoner's Privilege to File In
Forma Paupens Proceedings: May it be Numerically Restricted, Jody L.
Sturtz proposed limiting in forma paupens filings to three per year.1 9
Although there is no magic number that maximizes society's interest m
curbing abusive litigation while still protecting a prisoner's constitutional
rights, both Sturtz's three-per-year limit and Tler's more liberal one-per-
month limit avoid the constitutional difficulties that plague the PLRA. The
Tyler and Sturtz solutions "will almost never bar a prisoner from bringing
a legitimate civil rights claim [because] the statute of limitations allows
a prisoner many years to commence a claim before the claim is barred."120
The statute of limitations problem, which Sturtz avoided by proposing
a limit of three claims per year, is not avoided in Congress's PLRA. The
PLRA denies prisoners the opportunity to proceed in forma paupens after
having made three frivolous claims. Since some prisoners are incarcerated
for long periods of time, the ban may well result in the loss of potentially
legitimate claims forever. As Sturtz noted, not all states toll the statute of
limitations until an inmate is released from prison.'2' Therefore, the
PLRA's change results in an unconstitutional denial of physical access to
1161Id.
117 See id. ("The difference between § 1915(g) and the power of federal courts
to limit abusive litigation is that a federal court limits abuse m response to the
actions of an individual litigant based on particular circumstances.").
118 See id.
"9S Sturtz, supra note 13, at 1368.
120 Id. at 1371 ("The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is the most
analogous statute of limitations under the law of the state where the action is
brought. In Miclugan, the statute of limitations for § 1983 causes of actions is three
years. Many states toll the statute of limitations during the term of imprisonment
of the plaintiff.").
121 See id. at 1375-76.
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the courts similar to the denial m Exparte Hull." Prisoner petitions will
be barred forever from reaching the courts if the statute of limitations runs
before the prisoner is released.
Proponents of the PLRA point out that the federal courts are not the
sole outlets for prisoner grievances.'2 The prison grievance system is
specifically intended to deal with prisoner complaints without the costly
intervention ofthejudiciary. I' However this system "is not a substitute for
the courts in resolving constitutional claims."'1 Access to the court system,
not the resolution of grievances per se, is the core of the Bounds guarantee.
Thus, despite the availability of extra-judicial alternatives, court
restrictions that have survived constitutional challenges noticeably have not
relied on prisoner grievance systems to satisfy the Bounds constitutional
command.
Another solution to overzealous litigants was approved by the Seventh
Circuit m the case of In re Davis,26 in which an injunction was ordered
against Davis, who had filed at least thirty-one cases within forty months.
Many of these petitions were repetitive, because Davis either
misunderstood or simply rejected the doctrine of res judicata. 127 The court
orderedthat"[t]he Executive Committee examine any documents proffered
by Mr. Davis and determine whether or not they should be filed and, if Mr.
Davis seeks leave to proceed informapauperts, whether such leave should
be granted."' s
The Davis injunction is constitutional because it "does not preclude or
even unduly burden Davis from submitting a new, nonfrivolous complaint
or nonfrivolous filings." '29 The injunction acts as an absolute bar to Davis'
future frivolous claims only But, since there is no right to file frivolous
claims,30 such a bar is valid. The PLRA is significantly flawed in that it
does not discriminate between frivolous and non-frivolous claims; it lumps
the two together and bars them as a group. Therefore, since it cannot
simply be assumed that a prisoner who files three frivolous claims will
122 Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
'3See Lyon, 940 F. Supp. at 1437
The PLRA prohibits any prisoner from bringing an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 "until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42
U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West Supp. 1997).
12 Lyon, 940 F Supp. at 1437
11 In re Davis, 878 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1989).
127 See id. at 211.
128 Id. at 212.
129 Id. at 213.
'30 See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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never file a meritorious claim, the PLRA indeed denies access in violation
of the Constitution.
The PLRA three-strikes provision more closely resembles the
restriction in In re Green than it does other constitutionally valid
restrictions.131 The absolute ban on Green prohibited hun from ever filing
in forma paupens again. Since he would not be able to afford the $120
filing fee plus the additional cash deposit, the order effectively denied
Green all access to the court. In contrast to the injunction imposed in In re
Davis, and the one-filing-per-month limitation imposed in In re Tyler,
Green does not provide the litigant with any "reasonable and adequate
opportunity" to file with the court.131 The Green court agreed that petitioner
had "flagrantly abused the judicial process; 133 however, this type of
injunction conclusively presumes that anything Green submits to the
district court will be duplicative, frivolous, or malicious. 34"While methods
that other courts have employed to deter Green from continuing to harass
them amount in effect to rebuttable presumptions that Green is submitting
papers in bad faith, those orders have left the courthouse door ajar, if only
slightly." 1
35
The PLRA falls into the same trap as the district court did in Green.
Like the Green restriction, the ban after three frivolous filings also
presumes that anything that the prisoner "submits to the district court will
be duplicative, frivolous or malicious. 1 36 Yet, defenders of the PLRA
reject the notion that this reform denies prisoners access to the courts.1 37 By
documenting instances under the PLRA m which access is not demed, they
contend access is never denied.1
38
Faced with one ofthe first constitutional challenges to the three-strikes
provision of the PLRA, the district court in Lyon v. Vande Krol rejected the
argument that since complete access was not denied, effective access
likewise was not denied.139 After enactment of the PLRA, the prisoner-
plaintiff, Lyon, attempted to proceed in forma paupens with a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claun.' Lyon alleged prison officials denied him participation in
131 See In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785-86 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
3 2 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977).
1 In re Green, 669 F.2d at 785.
'34 See id.
135 Id. at 785-86.
136 Id. at 785.
137 See Lyon v. Vaude Krol, 940 F Supp. 1433, 1437-38 (S.D. Iowa 1996),
appeal dismissed, No. 96-3752, 1997 WL 638238 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 1977).
138 See id.
131 See id. at 1438.
140 See Id. at 1435; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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Jewish services and other religious practices. 4' Initially, the court followed
the PLRA's three-strikes provision and dismissed Lyon's complaint due to
Ins previous filing of three frivolous suits.142 However, on subsequent
rehearing, it struck down the statute, holding that the provision "places a
substantial restriction on these inmates' ability to bring a new civil action
and constitutes a substantial burden on their fundamental right of access to
the courts."143
The proponents of the PLRA contend that access is not denied across
the board to every inmate regarding every type of claim. 44 This assertion
is correct. Filings by wealthy prisoners, for example, clearly are not
affected, and consequently, neither is their access. Similarly, access
remains available to indigent prisoners threatened with imminent and
serious physical harm. 45 However, the existence of access for some
inmates does not mean all inmates are similarly situated. Rather, it "simply
narrows the class affected."' "The proper focus of constitutional inquiry
is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the
law is irrelevant."'147 To the prisoners affected, the courthouse door is not
left ajar, but rather is sealed shut. The Constitution demands that the door
remain open.
CONCLUSION
The PLRA addresses a serious and high profile problem. The goal of
decreasing frivolous prisoner litigation is laudable. Although replacing the
waiver of filing fees with a payment program may discourage some
legitimate prisoner suits, it does not deny indigent prisoners access to the
courts. On the other hand, by including the three-strikes provision, the
PLRA subverts the Constitution to achieve a decrease in prisoner lawsuits.
A prisoner's history of frivolous litigation should not result in the
subsequent denial of his constitutional right of access to the courts.
141 See Lyon, 940 F Supp. at 1435.
142 See id. at 1438-39.
143 Id. at 1438.
144 See id. at 1437-38.
141 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994).
14 Lyon, 940 F Supp. at 1437
147 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992).
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